Lal Krishan Advani is a lucky man. Fortune has given him the chance of a lifetime. He can save the historic Indo-US nuclear accord and grow in stature from a politician to a statesman. Less than four weeks remain, after which the treaty will die. The Left has no room for manoeuvre, but the BJP does. If Advani seizes the day and persuades his BJP colleagues, he will go into history as the "white knight" that saved India's energy and security future. He would also take a giant step to fill the large shoes of his predecessor, and become more worthy in the eyes of NDA's coalition partners.
A hundred years from now history books will recount that when oil was ruling at $135 a barrel, India's leaders were complacent. They argued that since 65% of India's power needs are met by coal and only 3% by nuclear energy, why does India need a nuclear treaty? Oil did run out in the 21st century, but the nuclear deal rescued India. Initially, it freed the country from 35 years of nuclear apartheid, allowing it to import uranium, which helped to lift the performance of its 17 reactors from 50% to 95%. After the treaty, India's energy needs were increasingly powered by nuclear energy while other countries scrambled for the last few barrels of oil.
History will describe how China rose in the second quarter of 21st century to dominate the world. Some Asian nations became its satellites, including its closest ally, Pakistan, to which it supplied vast quantities of arms. India was able to hold its own thanks to the treaty, which paved the way for closer ties with the western democracies. The West stood by India during its times of trouble and eventually India went on to balance power in Asia and the world.
History will narrate that the nuclear treaty never compromised India's right to Pokhran III. China and France did nuclear tests in 2020, which ended the CTBT regime. India was by then the world's third largest economy, and it followed up with its own test. The Democrats in America, instead of throwing the CTBT at India, were relieved to see India balance Chinese power in Asia.
History will report that during the 2009 election campaign Advani confidently took credit for having saved India's future from a traitorous Left and an indifferent Congress. During his campaign, Advani claimed that in saving the accord he had merely completed a process that Vajpayee had begun with Pokhran II, Jaswant Singh had followed up in his dialogues with Strobe Talbott and Brajesh Mishra with Condoleezza Rice. Manmohan Singh had crowned this effort, he said, showing great wisdom in signing the accord with Bush. He claimed that BJP's pressure forced crucial changes in the final treaty in India's favour. Advani told voters that when the UPA let its own prime minister down, BJP had to rescue the nation's honour and energy future.
This history will also have a coda. When he was trying to persuade his BJP colleagues in June 2008, Advani quoted from Arrian's account of Alexander the Great. As the Greeks were crossing the Jhelum in narrow boats on a stormy monsoon night in 326 BC, just before their famous battle with Raja Puru, Alexander told his generals, "Don't be afraid my friends, your grandchildren will sing your praises and remember your glory." Hearing this, the BJP leadership broke into applause. They had finally found a statesman to lead them to victory at the next elections. Rescuing the nuclear treaty became the turning point in the career of Lal Krishna Advani. | | | | | Running Out Of Time
| | There are media reports that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will make a last effort to rescue the nuclear deal from limbo and call an all-party conference to seek the understanding and support of political leaders. If this report is correct, it is a welcome move and he ought to have done it much earlier.
Now he has only a very narrow window of opportunity to get the deal through while President George Bush is in office. There is no doubt that a deal on such favourable terms is extremely unlikely with any other US administration.
It is time the prime minister asked nuclear scientists to clarify the grim situation on the availability of domestic uranium. They should stress that this was known from the late 1950s and early 1960s and hence Homi Bhabha's focus on the three-stage plan which in the final stage would use thorium, available in plenty in India. While there may have been mistakes in planning, the uranium shortage is not a temporary phenomenon as is claimed by some, but a basic constraint on India's nuclear programme.
The scientists should also clarify that mature thorium technology is at least some 30-40 years away and to reach that, India has to pass through the first phase of 50,000 MW of light water and heavy water reactors and the second phase of fast breeders. India cannot do this unless it signs the nuclear deal with the US, concludes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and obtains a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The scientists should also reiterate the assessment they gave in 1998 under the NDA government that the data they have collected in the Shakti tests would enable them to design warheads up to 200 kilotons. The standard size of warheads all over the world is 125-150 KT.
The international trend today is in favour of finalising the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, if any country launches a new weapons research programme, the nuclear agreement implicitly recognises India's right to conduct tests and is the only international agreement to do so.
The scientists would also do well to explain to political leaders the nuclear renaissance which is underway and the emerging nuclear programmes in the US, the UK, France, Russia and China. The advances in proposals to have international cooperation in nuclear energy programme such as GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) and fourth-generation reactors should also be explained. The future role of nuclear energy in a world facing the challenge of climate change has not been adequately appreciated in India.
The scientists should also explain the adverse impact the failure to go ahead with the nuclear deal will have on our future civil nuclear programme. There are media reports of an ambitious BARC-like nuclear complex being built on the east coast.
If the nuclear deal does not go through, the Department of Atomic Energy will be producing engineers and scientists who will have to seek employment opportunities outside India. In that case India will become the only country, which having declared itself a nuclear weapons state, will allow its civil nuclear programme and nuclear research to wind down.
The prime minister should explain to political leaders the full international diplomatic implications of India's failure to go ahead with the deal. The proposed nuclear deal is not an issue concerning merely bilateral Indo-US relations. Russia, France and other major industrial powers have a stake in it. If the deal is abandoned at this stage, India's credibility with all major powers, the IAEA and the 45 nations of the NSG will be affected.
The Indian leadership would let down not only the American president but the leaders of the UK, Russia, France, Germany and other major countries who have publicly supported the deal.
Future Indian prime ministers will find it very difficult to repair the damage inflicted on the country's international credibility.
Lastly, it creates a new constitutional problem. If this deal is scrapped, on the basis of reservations expressed by some political parties, it will create a precedent that all foreign agreements should get parliamentary approval before the cabinet proceeds further.
That goes against the basic principle of responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature in the parliamentary form of government. If the House disapproves of a government policy, in a parliamentary system it is up to the House to vote out the government. India cannot have a parliamentary system of government and vest in the legislature the powers of the US Senate.
The final issue is whether Manmohan Singh is to go down in history as the prime minister who damaged India's international credibility, wound up India's civil nuclear programme and created a precedent which is going to generate problems for smooth conduct of Indian foreign policy in future. As he often explains, he became prime minister by accident.
At this stage, he has to consider whether it is worth continuing as PM at any cost. Though he may feel grateful to the party which made him prime minister, his primary duty is to India and the Indian Constitution. He should not allow parochial considerations of some members of his coalition as well as a few of his own party colleagues to influence him to sacrifice the country's interests.
Courtesy :- TOI |
|
|
